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Particularly among feminist scholars, it is hardly fashionable anymore
to adhere to liberal feminism. Its goals are largely limited to achieving the
same rights and privileges for women as those held by men, without seri-
ously questioning the existing values and structures of male-defined insti-
tutions.' Against this increasingly skeptical background, Gender Justice
2
stands out as an ardent defense of conventional liberalism-not even liber-
alism as refined by current liberal feminists to take power, domination,
and the social construction of gender into account,3 but a nineteenth-
century brand of liberal philosophy evocative of Kant and Mill.4 The
book is also reminiscent of an earlier era because, in terms of the positions
the authors espouse, the issues they examine, and the social arrangements
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1. For critiques of liberal feminism, see J. ELSHTAIN, PuBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN (1981);
A. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 27-48, 173-203 (1983); Finley, Maternity
and the Workplace: Transcending Equality Theory, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986); MacKinnon,
Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515 (1982).
2. D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, GaDER JUSTICE (1986) [hereinafter cited by page num-
ber only].
3. For a discussion of liberal feminists' assessments of the social construction of gender and power
relations, see A. JAGGAR, supra note 1, at 175-81. See also Z. EISENSTEIN, FEMINISM AND SEXUAL
EQUALITY 189-254 (1984) (examining crisis of liberalism and radical potential of feminism to trans-
form liberalism by exposing how patriarchal ideology has distorted women's reality and meaning of
concepts such as "equality"); Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatmenti
Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1985) (analyzing social con-
struction of gender roles in pregnancy context and defending liberal approach of equal treatment).
4. Although the authors rely on J. MILL, ON LIBERTY (D. Spitz ed. 1974) (1859), see, e.g., pp.
14-16, 22, the lessons of Mill's essay The Subjection of Women seem lost on them. Mill, The Subjec-
tion of Women, in FEMINISM: THE ESSENTIAL HISTORICAL WRITINGS (M. Schneir ed. 1972). In this
essay Mill, displaying perceptions shared by the present day feminist "oppression theorists" derided
by Kirp, Yudof, and Franks, discusses how women are socialized to be dependent, to devalue any
sense of their own will, and to acquiesce in and contribute to their subordinate position. Mill decries
men's efforts to generalize about "women's nature" as tainted by socialization and domination and
cautions against reaching any conclusions "until women themselves have told all that they have to
tell." Id. at 162, 173. Mill's insight is consistent with the arguments of modern day feminists that a
governmental policy of blindness to gender, based on an ideal of liberty, can be problematic when
applied against a background of the legally sanctioned subordination of women fostered and en-
trenched by socialization.
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they leave unchallenged, the work seems barely touched by the recent pro-
fusion of feminist writings on gender issues.
The guiding principle of the book's analysis is liberty, understood as
the freedom to choose one's lifestyle, values, jobs, and relationships with-
out government interference. The authors disavow any commitment to a
particular distribution of resources, jobs, or social roles between men and
women. Instead, they opt for an ostensibly outcome neutral, process-
oriented approach to gender issues. This approach
focuses primarily on how individuals exercise choice and the limits
imposed on choosing. In this view, rules are needed to purge proce-
dures of all unnecessary impediments, leaving individuals as free as
possible to determine for themselves the relevance of gender. Choice
itself, not some specified social arrangement, becomes the yardstick
of goodness.5
The authors define justice as "enhancing choice for individuals, securing
fair process rather than particular outcomes for the community"; and they
"value self-determination over collective determinations of sex roles."
The only appropriate role for government policy and law, under this
view, is "to ensure that the public realm treats men and women as deserv-
ing of equal liberty."'7 Government should not "set out to change . . .
private choices in the name of imposing a better kind of community,"8 or
seek to establish "some fixed set of outcomes, either sex-based indis-
tinguishability or sex-based differentiations."9
The authors illustrate their conception of gender justice with a story
about the hypothetical state of Civitas.10 In this state, everyone works as
either a butcher, a baker, or a candlestick maker. There are, however,
sharp gender distinctions among the occupants of each job. Nine of ten
butchers are men; bakers are evenly divided between the sexes, although
women bakers concentrate primarily on making fancy toppings rather
than the bread of life; and only one candlestick maker in ten is a man. A
debate ensues between the Levellers, who see these statistics as evidence of
sexism and call for policies designed to produce an equal division of the
sexes in the two unbalanced occupations, and the Naturalists, who pro-
claim that the hand of nature is obviously at work and argue that justice
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unable to draw firm conclusions from the bare situation, are the Liber-
als." This group is full of questions: How did this distribution come
about? Does it reflect the real choices of men and women based on life
needs and circumstances, or does it reflect the operation of prejudices and
barriers that have forced men and women into these positions? If the for-
mer is true, then the "preferences deserve to be honored, for there is no
'right percentage' of male bakers or female butchers in all times and
places."' 12 If the latter, "justice demands that government intervene to re-
move these barriers to choice."1
Not surprisingly, the authors identify with the questioning Liberals.
Their book is an effort to explain and to justify the liberal conception of
gender justice as enhancing the autonomy of isolated, abstracted
individuals.
The justification takes several forms. First, the authors caricature the
explanations offered by "leftist feminists," who correspond to the Level-
lers in their story, and by right-leaning "Naturalists" for the current dis-
parities of roles and economic positions between men and women. They
criticize leftist feminists, a category they define to include radical femi-
nists, Marxists, and socialist feminists,14 for focusing on women as mem-
bers of a class, rather than as individuals who happen to be female.15 As
described by the authors, this group or class-based theory explains the
position of women as the result of oppression by men, an oppression cen-
tered on women's sexuality and reproductive capacity. In the authors'
view, the oppression theory can be readily dismissed as merely "a heuris-
tic device for perceiving and organizing the present," rather than an "ar-
gument subject to proof or falsification." ' The oppression theory's most
serious flaw, from the point of view of the authors who are committed to a
conception of men and women as freely choosing, autonomous individuals,
is that "it explains women's present condition in a way that absolves
women from any responsibility for having entered into this condi-
tion. . . . The idea of oppression thus creates a view of the world in





14. P. 48. The authors ignore the many differences between radical feminists, such as Catharine
MacKinnon, Marxist feminists, such as Juliet Mitchell, and socialist feminists, such as Alison Jaggar.
For a discussion of these distinctions, see A. JAGGAR, supra note 1, at 27-48, 83-118, 123-63. By
lumping together positions that differ in sophisticated ways, the authors grossly oversimplify the op-
pression theories of the writers they discuss.
15. P. 48.
16. P. 51.
17. P. 52. The authors' characterization misunderstands the oppression theory. One aspect of that
theory is to analyze how patterns of male domination create an atmosphere that makes women acqui-
esce in their roles. Rather than denying that women do and can make "choices," the theory questions
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Next, the authors take on the Naturalists, who, like the leftist feminists,
see women as weak and dependent, but who ascribe this inferior state to
biology rather than oppression."' Naturalists explain the social and politi-
cal dominance of men on the basis of fundamental physical, hormonal, or
neurochemical differences between men and women, including different
reproductive roles, the comparatively low level of aggression-fostering tes-
tosterone in women, and disparities in brain structures and sizes that af-
fect verbal skills and facility for spatial relations." The authors criticize
the Naturalists for ignoring the fact that the similarities between men and
women are far more significant than the differences. As the biopsycholo-
gist on whom the authors rely observes, cross sex differences are "'rather
minor compared to differences between people of the same sex: of all the
variations we observe among people, eighty to ninety-five percent of them
are within men and within women.' "20 The Naturalist position also errs
in seeing societally sanctioned limitations on women's roles as necessary
and inevitable, legitimately enforced by coercion in the name of benevolent
paternalism. This, of course, is highly offensive to a liberty-loving liberal
(as well as to a leftist feminist who would be ever alert to the forms of
socially constructed and contingent expectations regarding women that
have justified patriarchy):
It also reveals the ahistoricity of the naturalist approach, its failure
to note the possibility and reality of mediating nature's impact on the
lives of men and women through education, technology, and politics.
. ..In its inattention to the possibility of political choice, naturalism
also fails to recognize the relationship between "civilization," not just
mere survival, and limitations on brute nature. The present is
neither inevitable nor necessarily beneficent: this much we owe to
politics and morality.2"
Having thus disposed of both "feminism" and "naturalism" by arguing
in a circular fashion that both are inconsistent with the assumptions un-
derlying the choice principle they espouse,2 the authors further defend
the meaning and value of "choice" as currently defined. See infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
18. P. 53.
19. A classic example of the Naturalist view is S. GOLDBERG, THE INEVITABILITY OF PATRI-
ARCHY (1973). Goldberg bases his position on the greater amount of testosterone in males, which
gives them an advantage in strength and aggression. He sees this greater aggressiveness as the key to
male dominance. For a critique of the flawed assumptions and methodologies of sociobiological theo-
ries about male superiority based on hormonal and neural differences, see R. BLFER, SCIENCE AND
GENDER 80-109 (1984).
20. Pp. 53-54 (quoting from J. DURDEN-SMITH & D. DE SIMONE, SEX AND THE BRAIN 62-63
(1983) (remarks of Jerre Levy)).
21. P. 55 (citation omitted).
22. The authors criticize the analysis of the Naturalists and the leftist feminists for having a
common underlying weakness:
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the choice principle as the only alternative that devotes sufficient attention
to policy, or politics, "as that term is conventionally understood" to in-
clude such concepts as citizenship and participation in public affairs.23
Their criticism of Naturalists for looking only to "science" is partly cor-
rect, but does not go far enough. Science is permeated with and part of
"policy."'24 When Naturalists justify their world view in scientific terms,
they are making, and simultaneously masking, a profound policy judg-
ment. The authors wrongly criticize the leftist feminists' agenda for not
dealing with "politics" but with "something as diffuse, amorphous, and
ubiquitous as 'the culture,' ",25 and for demanding fundamental changes in
family structure and the world of work "without hinting how this
profound transformation might be brought about."28 Although diffuse and
omnipresent, the culture certainly has political implications and is an ap-
propriate subject for policy, because virtually every policy initiative will
affect and become part of the culture. Global attention to the intricate
interweavings of family, market, and politics is not a fruitless enterprise
simply because fundamental political and social change will be difficult to
achieve, and because some of the specifics may elude us until we have a
better grasp of the roots and implications of existing structures.27
[Tihe paradigms stress what happens to women, rather than attributing to them any signifi-
cant part in shaping their circumstances. Each of the paradigms ignores the existence of will;
neither in the world of the naturalists nor in that of the leftist feminists do there exist morally
responsible individuals. . . .Biology, economics, or culture-not the actions of individu-
als-are regarded as controlling.
P. 63. This account misstates the attitudes of each position toward the will. Rather than ignoring the
will, Naturalists assert that it cannot overcome biology. Leftist feminists assert that the will is strongly
influenced by societal power dynamics. Moreover, the authors never defend their assertion that "free
will" exists in individuals as something innate that develops and operates independently of biology
and social relationships. See infra Section II. Nor do they consider the feminist criticism that individu-
ated "autonomy" may not be the ideal aspiration in a world of interconnectedness. See infra Section
III. Nor do they justify the assumption, implicit in their criticisjn quoted above, that constructs known
as economics and culture are created and exist apart from the actions of individuals.
23. P. 57. The criticism that feminists do not speak in terms of politics as conventionally under-
stood is particularly inapt, since a crucial point of feminist theory and methodology is to challenge the
existing conception of politics. See, e.g., A. JAGGAR, supra note 1, at 133-48 (critiquing conception of
politics that rests on public/private dichotomy); MacKinnon, supra note 1, at 534 (stating that "per-
sonal is political" to demonstrate how matters usually thought of as private or personal are played out
in environment of power and domination and can be greatly influenced by public policies). Feminists
argue that the acceptance of existing definitions of politics guarantees perpetuation of the existing
order; it permits only political action within the framework of that order. See, e.g., K. FERGUSON,
THE FEMINIsr CASE AGAINST BUREAUCRACY 154-212 (1984).
24. See E. KELLER, REFLECTIONS ON GENDER AND SCIENCE (1985) (discussing ways in which
notions of scientific "truth" are tied to political and historical currents, or to world views of largely
male practitioners of science); T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). The
argument that because nature controls, nothing should be done to change the natural order is a policy
argument. Moreover, as the authors recognize, the Naturalist position can lead to the advocacy of
protective policies aimed at sheltering the reproductive capacities of women. See pp. 53-56.
25. P. 57.
26. P. 59.
27. Although some feminist proposals are quite specific in advocating certain laws and policies,
see, e.g., Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59
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After rejecting the explanations of nature and oppression as too extreme
and portraying their view as the only defensible and reasonable middle
ground, the authors explain the differences in social and economic posi-
tions of men and women as the consequences of paternalistic, protective
labor and family policies prevalent from the late nineteenth century until
quite recently.28 Paternalistic policies such as wage and hour legislation, 9
restrictions on the jobs available to women,30 and limitations on women's
right to vote, to make contracts, and to own property are designed to keep
women out of the rough and tumble public world and obviously constrain
choice.3 1 These policies treat women as a class, rather than as individu-
als. 2 They assume women's dependency and incapacity to make life
choices. They are, in effect, self-fulfilling prophecies that produce depen-
dency.33 This historical analysis provides the second major justification for
the liberty and choice approach: This approach, according to the authors,
will free us from the chains of protection and create a climate in which
men and women will be on equal footing to determine their own destinies.
In pointing to benignly motivated 34 paternalistic policies as the expla-
nation for gender injustice, the authors intend to distinguish the basis of
women's inferior status from that of blacks. Although blacks have cer-
tainly been the victims of paternalism, the authors view racial policies as
motivated by prejudice and hatred and designed solely to oppress and
B.U.L. REv. 55, 94-103 (1979) (outlining four types of legislation to aid working mothers); Taub,
From Parental Leaves to Nurturing Leaves, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 381 (1985) (advo-
cating passage of federal parental leave legislation); Williams, supra note 3, other works criticized by
Kirp, Yudof, and Franks, p. 59 (D. DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR (1976); N.
CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (1978)) and pp. 70-71 (C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIF-
FERENT VOICE (1982)), do not purport to be detailed blueprints for implementing change. The au-
thors' criticism is misplaced. These works of theory, informed by experience, are offered in the hope
that their insights will help us question the inevitability and impact of existing structures, in order to
free the imaginations of policy makers and individual actors to try something new or struggle with
reordering priorities.
28. Pp. 29-45.
29. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (hours of work legislation); Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (same).
30. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (height and weight requirement);
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (to be bartender, woman must be wife or daughter of male
owner); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (women not biologically suited for prac-
tice of law).
31. The authors assert that paternalism is an evil because it "dictate[s] to men and women their
best interests, convey[s] a sense of moral inferiority, and diminish[es] the sphere of liberty available to
both sexes." P. 42.
32. P. 30.
33. Pp. 33, 35.
34. They consider paternalistic policies towards women "benignly motivated" because, although
misguided, they were intended to help and protect women, and were presumably motivated by affec-
tion and respect for the maternal function. Pp. 41-45. For works calling these "benign" motivations
into question, see J. BAER, THE CHAINS OF PROTECTION (1978); A. KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT To
WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 180-214 (1982).
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guarantee subservience.30 Moreover, according to the authors, blacks were
widely perceived to be inferior beings, whereas women were not: "While
historically the state placed limits on women and treated them as less
competent, it never denied women's basic humanity. B38 The significance
of this distinction is that the authors concede that otherwise paternalistic
and choice retarding policies that are not race-blind, such as hiring prefer-
ences, still need to be employed to achieve racial justice. In their view,
however, we have reached the stage where gender-blindness should be
pursued in all policies.
3 7
The authors' final strategy is to apply the choice principle to several
policy issues and Supreme Court gender discrimination cases. The authors
contend that while government is not supposed to constrain choice in any
way, it should not sit by idly: "If liberty is to have meaning, individuals
must have the opportunity to choose, the capacity to make choices, infor-
mation on which to base preferences, and a climate of tolerance in which
to explore alternatives." 8 Thus, government policy should actively pro-
hibit discrimination, because discrimination "robs individuals of the
chance to make important life determinations for themselves."39 This will
require the abandonment and proscription of old practices, as well as pos-
itive initiatives, such as publicizing the removal of old barriers. To guar-
antee that individuals have the capacity to make choices, government
should also ensure that everyone's basic social and economic wants are
satisfied. Nevertheless, to avoid an expansion of state authority that would
subsume individual choice to the collective will, government should restrict
itself to the satisfaction of minimum needs, by, for example, providing a
guaranteed income, rather than attempting wholesale redistributions of
resources.
40
The authors summarize their blueprint for government action as
"[p]rotecting against discrimination, intervening in instances of market
failure, providing minimum economic support, disseminating information
[and] promoting tolerance," but not "imposing a particular conception of
35. Pp. 43-44.
36. P. 203. This assertion is strongly refuted by Gunnar Myrdal's classic study of racism in
America, in which he explores the parallels between racism and sexism. G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN
DILEMMA (1962). Myrdal demonstrates that paternalistic policies toward both women and blacks
were based on assumptions about their mental and emotional inferiority, their circumscribed proper
places in society, their contented acceptance of their lots, and the benevolence of the protection ac-
corded them by the law and the social conventions of white men. This "protection" for blacks and
women included denial of political franchise, restrictions on education, and relegation to low-paying,
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virtue."41 Applying these guidelines, the authors oppose comparable worth
policies because they believe choice and preference, not discrimination, un-
derlie job segregation. Furthermore, raising the wages of "women's jobs"
could discourage women from seeking higher paying "men's jobs," thus
interfering with their choice, and could eliminate some jobs for willing
pink collar workers. The liberty principle also leads the authors to oppose
affirmative action goals or timetables because they are too outcome ori-
ented, do not consider individuals as individuals, and impede the liberty of
those who are denied jobs in favor of affirmative action candidates.
In the family realm, the liberty oriented approach requires the elimina-
tion of preferences for traditional family forms.42 It requires the end of
gendered support and alimony laws; rather, government must leave these
financial issues to private bargaining through procedures adopted to en-
courage private ordering.4" It requires an income tax system that focuses
on the individual rather than the family, since family focused policies have
tended either to penalize two income married couples or single people.44
Finally, it requires that government provide a children's allowance rather
than direct subsidies for day care, so that individuals may make their own
child care arrangements without government influence.45
In turning to their new analysis of the Supreme Court equality cases,
the authors first criticize the prevailing approach, which compares men
and women, because it begs the question that they see as fundamental:
whether any of the asserted distinctions between men and women justify
sex-specific constraints on liberty.46 The constitutional animus, in their
view, "has more to do with constrictions on choice than with the desirabil-
ity of sameness."' 47 They criticize the Court's "similarly situated" analysis
as too unpredictable and malleable.48 They defend their liberty enhancing
approach as more principled and neutral, and suggest that it can lead to





45. Pp. 190-94. The policy issues chosen for discussion are a curious assortment. Some, like the
enforcement of marriage contracts and the income tax system, concern primarily the upper classes or
address relatively minor aspects of the social and economic subordination of women. Yet the authors
give very little attention to what many consider the crucial workplace issue facing women: the appro-
priate accommodation of maternity in the workplace. See Finley, supra note 1. The authors mention
this issue only as a passing observation in the chapter on paternalism, and state there that the provi-
sion of maternity leave is analogous to earlier protective legislation. P. 41. The authors do not even
mention another currently important feminist issue: the regulation of pornography. The failure to
discuss the pregnancy leave and pornography issues severely circumscribes the utility of a book that
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Although several cases have the same result whether the challenged pol-
icies are analyzed from the perspective of their effects on choice or from
the perspective of justifications for the differentiation between men and
women, some notable cases would have turned out quite differently under
the liberty analysis. Rather than asking whether a gender distinction has a
rational or substantial relationship to important governmental objectives,
the equal liberty approach considers the impact of a policy on the life
choices of men and women."9 In most instances, say the authors, this will
mean removing gender specific criteria, because such criteria usually in-
hibit choice. Sometimes, however, autonomy can be furthered by gender
defined opportunities, as in the area of sexual segregation. The authors
are not troubled by the decision in Vorchheimer v. School District of Phil-
adelphia,50 which upheld single sex public high schools, because single
sex secondary schools do not create a badge of inferiority for either sex. As
long as the educational opportunities are truly comparable, "offering
males and females the chance to be apart, if only for a small portion of
their lives, . . . afford[s] a richer mix of choices to everyone, and so [is]
compatible with the idea of equal respect.""" By contrast, Rostker v.
Goldberg,52 which upheld the limitation of draft registration to males,
would have a different outcome under the liberty principle because a rule
that categorically excludes women from an important civic obligation de-
nies.their equal liberty by "signiflying] that they are less than full mem-
bers of the society."58 Harris v. McRae," which validated a law with-
holding Medicaid funding for medically necessary abortions, would also
turn out differently. When Congress is denying "abortion funding to poor
sick women while offering both men and women every other kind of med-
ically essential treatment, it is constraining their liberty."'55 When the gov-
ernment funds one outcome of pregnancy-childbirth-but not another
possible outcome, it is burdening the choice of poor women. The authors
are also troubled by the decision in Planned Parenthood of Central Mis-
49. For example, Kirp, Yudof, and Franks approve of the reasoning in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636 (1975) (overturning provision of social security benefits to widows with dependent chil-
dren, but not to widowers), which focused on the effect of law on choices of those who decided to
follow nontraditional roles. Pp. 101-02. However, even where the results of the two analyses would
be the same, the reasoning in some cases would be very different. The authors would analyze differ-
ently a case like Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (striking down exclusion of women from
juries). In Taylor, the Justices focused on the unique perspective that women could bring to juries; the
authors criticize this approach as perpetuating the stereotypes underlying the exclusion. They would
simply declare the stereotypical attitudes and the exclusion to be liberty constraining. Pp. 103-04.
50. 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976) affd by an equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
51. P. 107.
52. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
53. P. 105.
54. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
55. P. 110.
Vol. 96: 914, 1987
Choice and Freedom
souri v. Danforth,56 which denied fathers a legal right to have a role in
the abortion decision. While acknowledging that this case presents a clas-
sic example of conflicting liberties, the authors view the blanket denial to
men of any liberty interest in the decision as a denial of their choice to
have and rear children.
57
It is certainly hard to argue with the noble ideal of equal liberty and
equal respect for the capacity of men and women to make their own life
choices that Gender Justice sets forth. Yet applying this principle can be a
much more complicated and political endeavor than the authors' analysis
contemplates. The authors overlook the ways in which power, domination,
and the consequent social construction of gender roles affect choice and the
configuration of community. Consequently, rather than serving as the
voice that reinvigorates classic liberalism as the preferred approach to our
society's thorny problems of gender dominance and differentiation, Gen-
der Justice merely illustrates the inadequacies of that approach. In dis-
cussing the book's limitations, I will focus on three aspects: 1) the ways in
which the choice principle, is not as outcome neutral, consistent, or coher-
ent as the authors profess; 2) the book's failure to probe the meaning of
"choice," and the implications of that failure for a freedom of choice ap-
proach in a society where race, class, ethnicity, and sex have a great deal
of impact on one's life prospects and horizons; and 3) the ways in which
feminist methodology offers a more constructive approach to the problem
of gender justice than classic liberalism.
I. THE ILLUSORY NEUTRALITY OF EQUAL LIBERTY
The authors' advocacy of outcome neutrality raises the twin questions
of whether it is really desirable or possible to be agnostic about social
ends. If we accept the desirability of outcome neutrality, then where is
there room, in the equal liberty approach, for concern about the effects of
existing structures of social order, or for commitments to rectify or amelio-
rate felt inequities? Reducing such concerns simply to opposing certain
practices because they constrain liberty does not sufficiently capture our
moral intuitions. Is there any role in the liberty theory for moral outrage
over practices such as the exploitation of female sexuality, the frequently
casual attitude of law enforcement officials toward domestic violence, or
the many other indignities faced by women?5"
56. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
57. Pp. 110-11.
58. Although some aspects of these practices, with the possible exception of pornography, could be
challenged as choice constraining, the dimension of moral outrage, which is lacking in the dispassion-
ate choice-enhancing argument, expresses something fundamentally important about who we are as
human beings, and how we want to live our lives.
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The authors might respond that such outrage has a place, for they are
not extreme libertarians; they would not permit the exercise of choice in
ways that fundamentally harm others. But what kinds of harm are suffi-
cient to constrain liberty, and how do we evaluate whether something is
harmful? For example, does the existing distribution of men and women
in the workforce, and the corresponding wage gap, harm women? Yes,
one might say, if these patterns are understood as the reflection of stereo-
typing assumptions, which-when combined with our society's traditional
lack of support for maternity policies and child care-reduce choice and
lock women into "women's jobs" and traditionally female roles. No, some-
one else who looks at the world quite differently might argue, this ar-
rangement causes no harm because it reflects choices and preferences
stemming from different values held by men and women.
These two plausible views of what is harmful and what is choice con-
straining illustrate that if we were really agnostic about social ends, we
would not know how to apply the liberty principle. Since we would have
no basis for choosing among different conceptualizations of a situation,
what we viewed as liberty enhancing would depend in part on the out-
come we considered desirable. A policymaker or judge would appreciate
those aspects of social context that accorded -with her personal values and
political orientation.5 ' This becomes apparent upon closer examination of
the .situations to which the authors apply the principle of choice
enhancement.
The authors analyze Frontiero v. Richardson"0 extensively to illustrate
the inconsistency of the Supreme Court's various equality approaches to
sex discrimination, and the superiority of their own approach. Frontiero
involved a challenge to a rule that entitled servicemen automatically to
claim their wives as dependents eligible to receive benefits and PX privi-
leges, but required a servicewoman to prove that her husband was eco-
nomically dependent on her before he could receive benefits. The authors
would uphold this rule under the liberty approach, because the rule did
not infringe on anyone's liberty by denying to one sex a benefit conferred
59. Indeed, the authors' preference for outcome neutrality is not apolitical. Their resort to neu-
trality is based on a value-laden set of political choices and assumptions-the idea that individuals
should determine their own conceptions of the good, the belief that justice can be determined according
to abstract principles rather than particular or contextual conceptions of the good, and the disavowal
of any community conceptions of virtue and justice imposed by the state. See Singer, The Player and
the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 40-41 (1984). Competing political visions,
including republicanism and communitarianism dating back to Aristotle, when juxtaposed with the
principle of liberty enhancing outcome neutrality, reveal its lack of neutrality. See, e.g., M. SANDFL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982) (critiquing view of human nature and justice un-
derlying traditional liberalism); Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adju-
dication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 544-80 (1986) (contrasting individualist liberal paradigm with classi-
cal communitarian virtue paradigm).
60. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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on another. The rule simply made it more inconvenient for women to
obtain the benefit.6" Looked at differently, however, the regulation im-
pedes liberty because it reflects stereotypes about the respective roles of
men and women within families, and helps entrench these stereotypes by
causing economic consequences to turn on whether or not a family fits the
traditional pattern. In addition, the regulation can be understood as invad-
ing the privacy, and thus the liberty, of servicewomen, because they must
open their family economic affairs to public scrutiny, while servicemen
need not.
62
A set of cases that demonstrates nicely the vagaries of the choice princi-
ple is the series involving sex-based payment and contribution differentials
in pension and life insurance plans.6" While the Supreme Court struck
down these differentials under antidiscrimination analysis, the liberty
principle, the authors claim, would sustain the use of sex-based actuarial
tables. Since life expectancy carries no stigma, using it as a decision crite-
rion affects no one's liberty. "It strains logic to analyze pension or life
insurance differentials as affecting the capacity of an individual to form
and act upon a life plan."'6 4 Nevertheless, with a slight switch of the ana-
lytic context from the impact of differentials on an insured woman's work-
ing years to the impact on her life after retirement or on her beneficiaries
after her death, the outcome of the liberty analysis changes. If a retired
woman receives less in pension payments each month than the man she
worked alongside for an equal number of years, isn't her liberty being
constrained in relation to his? Her options during retirement may be
fewer, because she will be able to afford less despite the same number of
years of work. To say that she may live longer than her male co-worker,
and thus may receive the same or more over the long run is no answer to
the choice-constraining standard of living problem, because monthly or
yearly income is much more important than overall income over a period
of years in determining a retiree's daily life options.
It is surprising that such strong individualists as the authors are not
more suspicious about the use of statistical generalizations that treat
women as a class. In the context of workplace pensions, such generaliza-
61. Pp. 92-93. This analysis overlooks the fact that all married servicemen would get the benefit
regardless of their family economic situation, while only certain exceptional servicewomen would get
the benefit.
62. See Tong, Liberty, Equality-Community?, WOMEN'S REv. BooKs, Jan. 1986, at 1 (review
of Gender Justice).
63. See, e.g., Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation
Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (state retirement plan paying lower monthly benefits to women
than to men violates Title VII); City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702 (1978) (pension plan requiring female employees to make larger contributions than male
employees violates Title VII).
64. P. 114.
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tions are indeed suspect, because the statistical data reflect, in part, tradi-
tional lifestyles and role constraints on women. One reason women have
tended to live longer than men may be that they have not been exposed to
as many occupational stresses and hazards.6 5 But as women enter into
previously all male occupational preserves, they will be exposed to the
same health threats. Thus, holding an individual working woman to the
statistical patterns generated by the social roles of a slightly earlier gener-
ation may, indeed, impede her liberty by discounting the lifestyle that she
has in fact chosen. When the general fact that women as a group live
longer than men is placed in its social context, the outcome of the choice
principle differs from the authors' application.
Affirmative action is yet another issue that can be resolved differently
under a liberty analysis depending on one's political values and the social
factors one selects for emphasis. The authors' position loses its veneer of
neutrality and consistency when they acknowledge that race-conscious pol-
icies such as affirmative action hiring goals may be necessary to overcome
the history of discrimination against blacks, but deny that similar policies
are necessary in the realm of gender discrimination."6 The only apparent
explanation for these disparate views is the authors' belief that racial dis-
crimination is somehow more pernicious and harder to rectify than sex-
ism. 17 This is definitely not a neutral, objective position. When it comes to
65. The major empirical work outside the legal and insurance literature concludes that social,
cultural, environmental, and behavioral factors are more important than genetic or biological factors
in explaining sex mortality differentials. See Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, Sex Discrimi-
nation in Employer-Sponsored Insurance Plans: A Legal and Demographic Analysis, 47 U. CHI. L.
REV. 505, 541-559 (1980) (summarizing demographic evidence of cultural factors that affect changing
sex mortality differentials, including occupational and lifestyle factors).
As a generalizable, statistical matter, mortality rates also vary in the United States according to
race, yet our society has long rejected as discriminatory the use of race-based mortality tables for
insurance and benefit purposes. Id. at 536, 538. Nevertheless, some commentators who decry the use
of race-based tables because they acknowledge that any statistical association between race and mor-
tality is environmental or social, rather than genetic, fail to see that this is also likely to be true for a
sex link. See, e.g., Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination: Manhart, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 83,
111-13; Randall, Risk Classification and Actuarial Tables as They Affect Insurance Pricing for
Women and Minorities, in U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIrHrs: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINORI-
TIES AND WOMEN IN PENSIONS AND HzALm, LIFE, AND DISABIUTY INSURANCE 527, 535-37, app.
A at 546 (1978).
66. Pp. 43-45, 137.
67. Indeed, the authors explicitly take this position. They argue that the inhumane and self-
serving motivations behind race discrimination necessitate affirmative corrective measures to remedy
the intentional disadvantaging of blacks. Conversely, they argue that such paternalistic measures are
inappropriate in the gender context where special consideration would only reaffirm the "special" role
of women. Pp. 43-45. While racism, of course, has long been a special problem for our society, this
does not belie the fact that sexism has also shaped our polity. The phenomenon of sexism simply has
not been subjected to as much scrutiny or evoked as much awareness as racism, and thus has been
considered less of a problem. Some aspects of sexism are so pervasive that they are not even recognized
as such, but instead are justified as the result of "natural" roles and differences. See, e.g., Finley,
supra note 1, at 1129-34; Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92
YALE L.J. 913, 931-40, 943-49 (1983).
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gender, the authors support process-oriented affirmative action policies
designed to get more women to apply for traditionally male jobs, to evalu-
ate selection criteria that may diminish women's opportunities to compete
for jobs, and to replace gendered hiring standards with neutral standards.
In their view, this consciousness raising style of affirmative action en-
hances liberty because it expands opportunities and choices. At the same
time, they oppose result-oriented affirmative action, such as goals or quo-
tas, because a quota can mean that an individual will be hired regardless
of merit. This can stifle efforts to obtain skills and qualifications, and can
discourage individuals from assuming responsibility for their own conduct
and exercising their right of self-determination. Quotas are bad because
they "deny the primacy of individuals, undermining the claim to equal
consideration as a person that is the cornerstone of autonomy."" s
Although affirmative action quotas may be problematic for a variety of
reasons,69 the authors' assertion that they infringe the liberty of their ben-
eficiaries is certainly open to question. The existence of a quota does not
compel any individual member of the desirable group who does not want
the job to take it. In this sense, it does not impede choice any more than
other opportunities.
Moreover, a hiring goal can be regarded as a much stronger expansion
of opportunities for those traditionally excluded than the exhortations
adopted under a process approach. Because such a goal increases the like-
lihood that an applicant from the traditionally excluded group will actu-
ally be hired, it expands that individual's choices and opportunities. It
may also enhance the self-respect and self-determination of the individual
members of the previously disadvantaged group, because they know that if
they do develop skills and qualifications, they will actually have a chance
of getting the job. In addition, a hiring goal may give employers stronger
incentives to scrutinize their job criteria for stereotypes and biases than
would a merely precatory policy about opening up job opportunities.
The real objection to affirmative action that Kirp, Yudof, and Franks
seem to be voicing is that it constrains the choices available to those who
previously had greater choices at the expense of others. But these were
false opportunities, created by the unfair advantages acquired by the pre-
ferred group through its exclusion of others. The affirmative action debate
obviously presents us with a situation of conflicting liberties: What may
be necessary to enhance the opportunities of some will, at the same time,
68. P. 166.
69. One of the reasons affirmative action policies can be problematic is that they can have a
backlash effect: In the minds of members of the traditionally advantaged group, any woman or black
who joins the workforce becomes suspect of being there, not because of qualifications, but as an "af-
firmative action baby." Such perceptions make it doubly difficult for the new workers to gain
acceptance.
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constrict the opportunities of others. How one chooses to resolve this con-
flict in the context of affirmative action may depend on whether it is con-
sidered better to prefer the liberty of the previously disadvantaged, or
whether it is better to preserve the choices of the advantaged group while
hoping that less drastic, exhortatory policies will bring the opportunities
of men and women into better balance. Neither is a politically neutral or
outcome neutral position.
Kirp, Yudof, and Franks' arguments against comparable worth also can
be stood on their heads. Some of the authors' arguments, such as the diffi-
culty of making sensible comparisons"0 and the dangers of bias creeping in
through job evaluation systems, 1 have little to do with their liberty princi-
ple. Their resort to arguments outside the scope of their neat framework
raises doubts about their oft-professed outcome neutrality. It suggests a
hostility towards the transformation of values and roles that is the deeper
aspiration of the comparable worth movement."
As for the effect of comparable worth wage scales on choice, the authors
contend that the pay equity movement could hurt the choices of women
who might be likely to seek traditionally male jobs."3 According to their
argument, if a woman would be paid more as a nurse, maybe she
wouldn't want to be a doctor; if paralegals were paid a true professional's
wage, then maybe a young woman in this new women's job ghetto would
abandon her aspirations to go to law school; if a woman could earn as
much as her boss by being a secretary, then why would she want to be the
boss? Aside from its dubious assumption that money is the main reason
people choose certain jobs, this choice-based argument is internally contra-
dictory because it implies that there are currently some people holding
traditional male jobs who might really want to do "women's work" but
feel they simply cannot afford to follow their preference. If money can
coerce one group of people, it can coerce the other too. It seems equally
plausible to argue that if the wage disparities between predominantly fe-
male and predominantly male jobs are narrowed, then both men and
women will be freer to choose what they really want to do, without feel-
70. P. 168.
71. P. 169.
72. Indeed, the authors tip their hands to their value preferences when they denigrate an outcome
in which "[w]omen could carry on at their familiar jobs as librarians and teachers and secretaries, at
pleasantly unfamiliar wages, the system driven by an administrative apparatus which paid them ac-
cording to their 'true' worth. That does not seem an especially salutary outcome." P. 171. This state-
ment is insulting to women and to their traditional work, because it assumes that the work women do
is neither important nor worth more than it now commands, and that no one would want to do that
kind of work if higher paid men's work were readily available. It is precisely such biased assumptions
that the underlying philosophy of the comparable worth movement challenges. Moreover, one is
tempted to ask what our society would be like without teachers, librarians, nurses, and secretaries.
73. Id.
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ing economically compelled. Indeed, as the salaries paid for jobs such as
schoolteachers and nurses have risen, greater numbers of men have begun
moving into these positions. One could argue that the most choice-
enhancing policy is to pay all jobs the same, so that all potential economic
coercion is eliminated.
The authors again let values and biases slip into their supposedly neu-
tral and consistent framework when they consider the coverage of preg-
nancy under disability benefit plans. They see this issue as a balancing of
liberties problem: the interest of the employer and nonpregnant employees
in not increasing aggregate costs of health benefit plans, versus the interest
of pregnant women in securing coverage of maternity leave. But, in the
authors' view, the latter interest is much less compelling. "Unlike other
disabilities covered by employee health plans, pregnancy is usually volun-
tary and welcomed; because the medical costs associated with normal
pregnancy are relatively low, the ordinary family can usually plan for
them. 1 74 Virtually every assumption underlying this argument is either
erroneous or based on the life situation of the white, heterosexual, mar-
ried, middle-class couple-quite surprising for authors who take great
pains throughout their book to assert sensitivity to nontraditional life-
styles. Moreover, the argument completely ignores the way in which the
lack of workplace accommodation of pregnancy historically has greatly
impeded women's employment choices, and has entrenched the stereotypi-
cal and choice-constraining views of women's place in the home."5
It is not readily apparent how the voluntariness of pregnancy bears on
the interests of women and men in having pregnancy coverage in an em-
ployer's health plan. 6 The interest for providing such coverage comes
from the importance that society traditionally has ascribed to pregnancy
and the need for women not to sacrifice economic security because of their
decision to get pregnant. Given that the voluntariness of pregnancy is ir-
relevant to the importance of pregnancy coverage in disability benefit and
leave policies, one suspects that whether or not pregnancy is "voluntary"
is not the real motivation behind the "voluntariness" argument. The argu-
74. P. 109.
75. See Finley, supra note 1, at 1122-42.
76. It is hard to believe that the voluntariness of pregnancy was the real reason it was excluded
from coverage. Most health benefit plans that excluded pregnancy covered other voluntary procedures,
such as cosmetic or elective surgery. This was true of the plan excluding pregnancy that the Supreme
Court upheld in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); see also Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484 (1974) (California insurance plan that excludes pregnancy does not violate equal protection).
The exclusion of pregnancy from disability plans has since been barred by the Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C § 2000e(k) (1982)).
Moreover, pregnancy is not always voluntary in the sense of being consciously planned or welcomed.
To assert that it usually is ignores failures of birth control devices and rape; it also overlooks the
situation of the working poor who are already financially strapped by existing children, but who
cannot afford abortion due to Medicaid funding restrictions.
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ment masks the traditional assumption that a woman's primary role is to
have children, and that work outside the home is inconsistent with that
role. While such an assumption is perfectly compatible with the view that
it is important for women to bear children, it denies women the opportu-
nity both to work and have children. Men, of course, have always been
able to choose to engage in reproductive behavior with no adverse employ-
ment consequences." When viewed from this perspective, an employer's
exclusion of pregnancy from its disability and leave plans constrains the
liberty of women.
The authors' assumption that the costs of normal pregnancy are low in
comparison to other items covered under health benefit plans is also ques-
tionable. With the current medical malpractice insurance crisis, which is
hitting obstetricians quite hard,78 the costs of routine prenatal care and
non-Caesarean deliveries can be as much as one thousand five hundred
dollars. 9 Caesarean deliveries, which are becoming more prevalent, can
approach two thousand dollars.80 It is doubtful whether most ordinary
working families can easily absorb such costs, especially with the huge
costs of rearing a child staring them in the face. But what of single
mothers, and what about the working poor, and what about married
women whose husbands are not employed?
In sum, the "voluntary," "welcome," and "inexpensive" arguments for
denying economic security to pregnant working women and their families
are heavily value-laden. They presuppose a view of the proper role and
place of women and the appropriate relationship between women's repro-
ductive roles and their desire to work. It is not an outcome neutral posi-
tion to support exclusions that have kept women out of the workplace
during their childbearing years.
The lack of objectivity and neutrality in the liberty principle is fre-
quently apparent in situations acknowledged by the authors to involve
conflicting liberties,8 1 or in instances where enhancing the liberty of an
individual may conflict with the general welfare.8 2 Kirp, Yudof, and
77. See Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1,
21-37 (1985); Brief Amici Curiae of Coalition for Reproductive Equality in the Workplace at 7, 14,
21-22, California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 106 S. Ct. 783 (1986) (No. 85-494) (granting
certiorari).
78. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1985, at Al, col. I (rising number of malpractice suits spurring
some doctors to leave obstetrics).
79. Telephone conversation with Gisela Garthright, business manager for Obstetrics and Gyne-
cology at Yale-New Haven Hospital, New Haven, Connecticut (Nov. 11, 1986).
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., p. 110 (discussion of Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
67-72 (1976) (interest of potential father versus that of potential mother in abortion decision)); p. 107
(discussion of Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (interest of male nursing
student attending school in hometown versus interest of women students in single-sex education)).
82. Pp. 111-13.
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Franks offer little more than a good old balancing test to resolve these
tensions: Figure out whose liberty will be hurt more, and choose the op-
tion that avoids this greater evil; or, evaluate the magnitude of the collec-
tive gain against the centrality to personal autonomy of the endangered
individual interest.8"
Such balancing tests, however, are highly contingent. The outcome de-
pends on what factors are selected for emphasis and who is evaluating the
relative strengths of the respective liberties. For example, if the deci-
sionmaker is morally opposed to abortion, the father's interest in prevent-
ing an immoral act will be seen to outweigh any interest the woman has
in doing that act. But if the evaluator thinks that a woman's right to
control her reproductive capacity is vitally important to her self-
realization, and that a man's biological role in producing a child is of less
duration and physical consequence than a woman's role, then the wo-
man's liberty interest will clearly "win." There is no neutral, objective
way to calibrate and compare the relative weights of two liberty interests,
nor is the result of any balancing effort outcome neutral. Sometimes, a
balancing test can simply be an invitation for the perspective and prefer-
ences of the traditionally powerful to triumph once again."'
This last observation suggests a further problem with Kirp, Yudof, and
Franks' belief that their analysis is consistent and outcome neutral. They
can be fairly criticized for overlooking the problem that in any society in
which great disparities of power, wealth, and gender roles exist, the
meanings of both "choice" and "choice-enhancing" are intensely political
issues.
II. THE MEANING OF CHOICE IN A GENDERED WORLD
At the outset of chapter four on "Gender in the Context of Commu-
nity," Kirp, Yudof, and Franks allude to an issue that should be crucial to
their choice analysis. Given that individuals "are profoundly affected by
the communities in which they live," should "this realization . . . modify
[the] conception of gender justice as grounded in individual choice
?"I" What is the meaning of individual choice and self-determination
within a social fabric of human interdependence and interaction where
"reality" and expectations are more often than not socially constructed?
The authors never grapple with this profound question. They virtually
dismiss it when they state that "we object to a view of human nature that
83. Pp. 112-13.
84. For a critique of the indeterminacy and power reinforcing tendencies of balancing tests, see,
e.g., Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1707-10
(1976); Singer, supra note 59, at 31-32.
85. P. 67.
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rejects the proposition, key to liberalism, that women and men can shape
their own lives," 6 and then continue in chapter four to discuss only their
ideal vision of an open community of diversity and tolerance. This dismis-
sal misses the insight that each individual exists in the context of a com-
munity. Without denying the possibility that individuals shape their own
lives, it is important to explore how individuals are shaped by their rela-
tions to others in ways that, in turn, affect how individuals shape them-
selves. To phrase the inquiry as a question: Given that an individual's
race, class, ethnicity, religion, geographical location, and gender greatly
affect his or her life options and character, what, in this context, is the
meaning of "individual choice"?
Gender roles are creatures of powerful social construction, with some
measure of biology thrown in. Whether someone is a man or a woman
may be one of the most important factors in determining how others react
to him or her, what is expected of him or her, and what horizons may be
open to him or her. From infancy, girls and boys are subtly, and some-
times not so subtly, socialized into different roles. Girls are strongly so-
cialized into the role of nurturer with its accompanying tasks of caretaking
and household management, while boys are often expected to have little
involvement in these aspects of family life. Girls and boys look at the
world around them and see almost exclusively men doing certain jobs, and
women others. This realization greatly affects their perceptions of the
goals to which they appropriately should aspire.
87
These perceptions are also affected by the very different messages given
to boys and girls about what will give them social approval and connec-
tion, rather than isolation, and about what they should "want." Boys are
encouraged in the traits of "masculinity"-be athletic, do not show emo-
tions, be competitive, be aggressive, and set your sights high in the world,
well beyond the private sphere of family. Girls are encouraged in the
traits of "femininity"-do not be competitive or aggressive, place primary
emphasis on cooperating, giving, and caring, even at the expense of your
own needs, and do not be too ambitious, especially in wanting tradition-
ally male attributes, because that could harm your prospects for happy
personal relationships. 8 Girls are taught: Set your sights on family and
86. id.
87. For example, a friend of mine who feels he has tried very hard not to constrain his daughters
in traditionally female ways told me about asking his young daughter what she wanted to do when
she grew up. She replied that she wanted to be a stewardess. When he asked her whether she might
want to be a pilot instead, she responded with that exasperated child's voice that signals that adults
just don't understand, and told him that she couldn't be a pilot because only men are pilots. Her
father responded that she indeed could be a pilot if she wanted, despite the almost total absence of
women role models, but this little girl was already attuned to the dangers and difficulties of breaking
out of conventional social roles.
88. For a discussion of the socialization into and the complexities of femininity, especially as they
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relationships, and of course aspire to a career, too, but just don't forget
that your main concern should be your "private life."89 The socialization
of a girl into femininity tends to go hand in hand with a message that she
should accept her designated role, because striving too much for other
roles could mean the horrors of social isolation, loneliness, and disap-
proval, and should focus her thoughts on the needs of others rather than
on self-determination. Indeed, "self-determination" for a woman, more so
than for a man, is often conceived in terms of her ties to others and the
interests of those with whom she is connected. 90
Acknowledging the reality of socialization does not deny free individual
choice or, for women in particular, the chance to break out of patterns of
traditional socialization. But, the forces of socialization are powerful and
can be especially powerful in the way they shape those without societal
power. For the powerless, the consequences of defying socialization are
more problematic. If you are in a situation of economic and social depen-
dency, trying to break out of a traditional role can mean the loss of that
upon which you depend for survival. As the feminist theorist and political
scientist Kathy Ferguson has observed:
Part of the perniciousness of femininity in our society is that it pro-
duces people who claim to choose what they are supposed to want,
and claim to want what they have. Once acknowledging the ways in
which knowledge and power are dialectically bound together, it be-
comes an act of viciously acquired naivete to equate all expressed
preferences with self-defined interests. 1
A discussion of gender justice that focuses on individual choice is incom-
plete without consideration of the significance of being a woman in this
largely male-defined society, and its implications for self-determination.
To be a woman in this society may mean being physically vulnerable to
abuse and sexual exploitation and imposes consequent constraints on one's
actions. It means having to take principal responsibility for caretaking
tasks; often these tasks must be put ahead of other responsibilities and a
relate to ambition, see S. BROWNMILLER, FEMININrrY 221-31 (1984).
89. This continued societal ambivalence about women holding "male" careers lurks behind the
recent media attention to the diminishing marriage prospects for women after their late twenties,
especially women who have delayed attention to personal concerns until after establishing careers. See,
e.g., Too Late for Prince Charming?, NEWSWEEK, June 2, 1986, at 54. There is an implicit condem-
natory message in stories such as the Newsweek piece. Women are being chided for striving after
nontraditional roles, and are being told by the media that they have gotten their comeuppance in the
form of personal unhappiness and that most horrible of fates-spinsterhood and childlessness. Mean-
while, men are not criticized for putting career ahead of family. Cohen, What's a Woman To Do?,
Washington Post, May 31, 1986, at A23, col. 8.
90. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 27. This work casts doubt on the traditional, male-defined concept
of self-determination as something that can be achieved wholly apart from connections to others.
91. K. FERGUSON, supra note 23, at 177 (1984).
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woman's own needs or else they will not get done. The qualities and skills
that women traditionally are taught to develop are not those highly valued
in the public work world; consequently, when women enter that world,
they find an environment largely insensitive to caretaking responsibilities.
If women demonstrate the male traits that are valued in the public world,
such as competitiveness, assertiveness, or physical strength, they may find
that they are viewed with suspicion or outright hostility and they may be
labelled too bitchy or uncooperative to deserve promotion.92 In this con-
text, trying to pursue a nontraditional path can mean isolation, lack of
supportive role models, and far greater personal sacrifices than those faced
by men following the same paths. It may also mean having to cope with a
sense that you may be crazy, maladjusted, incompetent, or simply "out of
synch" with the world." Is it any surprise, then, that women may
"choose" to follow traditional roles and jobs, and "not want" certain posi-
tions that are structured around the traits and interests of the men who
have traditionally occupied them?
At this point, Kirp, Yudof, and Franks would probably object that I am
just another deterministic, leftist feminist, who subscribes to the oppres-
sion theory by portraying women as victims who have no responsibility
for their plight. Such an objection would misstate and grossly oversimplify
this "leftist feminist" position, and would fundamentally miss its point.
Leftist feminism is not a conspiracy theory that attributes conscious design
to all men and absolves women of all responsibility for their lot.94 Rather,
analysis of the ways in which women are oppressed explores how the
options, choices, and dignity of women have been systematically con-
strained by their powerless positions throughout history. Women have
been excluded outright from most domains of the public world. They have
been classified by political theorists as nonpersons or as morally deficient
human beings.95 They have been labeled by the law as the property of
92. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1985). Judge Gesell
found that an accounting firm had practiced sex discrimination in violation of Title VII when it used
a subjective, male-dominated evaluation system to block the promotion of a woman to partner because
of her aggressive style, a style that the firm tolerated in men. Id. at 1118-20.
93. Virginia Woolf discusses the personal and social penalties suffered by women who dared to be
different. V. WOOLF, A Room OF ONE'S OWN 62-86 (1929). In analyzing the question why there
have been no great women artists, writers, or composers, she chronicles the social opprobrium that
any woman who dared to engage in these activities would have faced. Id. at 74-75. Yet, despite the
barriers that obstructed them, some women did become artists, although some of them had to publish
under men's names. This example from history demonstrates that social expectations can indeed affect
choice.
94. Indeed, many feminist writers have discussed the ways in which women have been complic-
itous in maintaining patriarchy. See S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 88; S. DE BEAUVOIR, THE SEC-
OND SEX, 475-698, 663-98 (H. Parshley trans. 1974); M. FRENCH, BEYOND POWER (1985).
95. See, e.g., A. JAGGAR, supra note 1, at 36-37 (discussing views of Aristotle, Hume, Rousseau,
Kant, Hegel, and Freud that women are inferior to men in their capacity for rational thought and
moral agency); S. OKIN, WOMEN IN WEsTRoN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1979).
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their fathers or husbands and have been considered akin in status to chil-
dren and mental incompetents.96 The public world has been structured to
be blind to the experiences, perspectives, needs, capacities, and contribu-
tions of women. 7 These facts highlighted by the oppression argument
demonstrate that simply removing some of the obvious constraints imposed
on women does not automatically create a world of unconstrained oppor-
tunity and full self-determination. Fundamental power relations are not
easily changed, nor are the imprints left on women's consciousness and
self-conception. Moreover, the typically female virtues of being sweet,
helpful, agreeable, emotional, sentimental, obedient, and self-effacing con-
tinue to lead more readily to subordination than to autonomy."8 The "op-
pression argument" is really the analysis of the social, psychological, and
legal consequences of powerlessness. The insights of this analysis lead to
the realization that abstract concepts such as liberty and freedom of choice
are problematic in a gendered world. Many aspects of being a woman in
this culture blur the seeming clarity of a concept such as "choice." 99 This
is true even if we accept Kirp, Yudof, and Franks' premise that we each
have a will that exists wholly apart from our social conditioning. Under
their view, our independent will is not shaped by social context; neverthe-
less, even accepting their premise it remains true that we may make deci-
sions with an appreciation for their social consequences.
Absent any sensitive discussion of the effects of the social construction of
96. For descriptions of these treatments of women, see Polan, Toward a Theory of Law and
Patriarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 254 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Taub & Schneider, Perspectives on
Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in id. at 117. This history makes the authors' assertion
that women experienced a far different situation from blacks seem ludicrous. See supra notes 28-37
and accompanying text. The very fact that the authors can so blithely conclude that women have only
been the object of solicitous protections, rather than of any deeper discriminatory animus, illustrates
how sexism is so firmly entrenched and accepted that it is often invisible or at least is not acknowl-
edged as the invidious creature that it is.
97. This blindness permeates the educational system, too. For example, in teaching history the
traditional focus is on male activities, such as politics and war, while women's contributions to these
activities are largely ignored, except for a few nurturing angels of mercy or boyish maidens hearing
the voice of God. Defined as outside the scope of history, and thus not relevant to our current exis-
tence, are the areas of daily life in which women have figured prominently. For works of feminist
scholarship seeking to correct the omission of women from history, and to explore societal structures
that have rendered women's experiences invisible to history, see G. LERNER, THE MAJORITY FINDS
ITS PAST (1979); A. SCOTT, MAKING THE INVISIBLE WOMEN VISIBLE (1984); LIBERATING
WOMEN'S HISTORY (B. Carroll ed. 1976); Politics and Culture in Women's History: A Symposium, 6
FEMINIST STUD. 26-64 (1980).
The traditional view of what kind of education people need has also been dominated by male
activities and traits-the world of production, rather than the world of reproduction and nurturing.
This has contributed to the devaluation of qualities associated with women, and has further con-
strained women's choices and self-determination by subtly teaching them that their roles and exper-
iences are relatively unimportant. See J. MARTIN, RECLAIMING A CONVERSATION Ch. 7 (1986).
98. K. FERGUSON, supra note 23, at 191.
99. Men, of course, are forced into masculine roles by the process of socialization and the obliga-
tions of social and economic dominance. Breaking out of traditional male roles can be as isolating for
men as breaking from female roles is for women.
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gender roles, the principle of equal liberty can become a powerful justifi-
cation for the status quo. The existing order can too easily be seen as the
result of "natural" preferences, without any examination of whether the
values defining certain jobs or societal institutions sufficiently reflect the
experiences and needs of both men and women. In places, Gender Justice
displays this tendency to accept the status quo. For example, the authors
accept the current division between the functions and values of the public
and private spheres, and speak as if the quest for liberty and equality
concerns only the public sphere. 00 They do not grasp the ways in which
this false dichotomy has contributed to the unequal status of women and
continues to place many women in situations where choice is an illusory
concept.101 Nor do they consider that the public world of work might be a
much more humane place if it incorporated some of the values of the pri-
vate world, or that the private world might not remain "inherently une-
qual"' ' if it were not so sharply divided from the public.
The book's discussion of job segregation also illustrates the potential of
a theory based on an abstract principle of choice to exalt the status quo.
While laying some blame upon gender discrimination, 03 the authors insist
upon an additional explanation for why so many more women than men
are nurses, schoolteachers, secretaries, and domestic workers: Women
often choose these positions because the jobs demand a limited commit-
ment, use women's nurturing skills, and offer the kind of part-time or
relocational flexibility that enables women to combine their home and
family responsibilities with minimal strain. Thus, say the authors, the
market "partially mirrors personal preferences," and it is only natural
and a reflection of choice that women shape work around the demands of
home life, while men place work ahead of family.'" This explanation is
replete with inaccuracies about the commitment requirements and flexibil-
ity of "women's work"105 and displays startling insensitivity to the social
construction of roles, choices, and expectations. Deeply held notions about
the proper role for women-notions which seem incompatible with a free
choice theory-have strongly influenced the fact that women structure
100. Pp. 18-19, 199-200.
101. For discussions of how the public/private, market/family dichotomy has affected women, see
K. O'DONOVAN, SEXUAL DIVISIONS IN LAW (1985); Finley, supra note 1; Olsen, The Family and




105. It is false and demeaning to women to assert that jobs such as nursing or teaching require
limited commitments or little in the way of training or intellectual upkeep. It is also false that
"women's work" is more flexible. Often, pink collar ghettos have rigid time and hour expectations,
and provide few fringe benefits, thus further locking women into their state of economic dependency.
See S. KAMERMAN, A. KAHN & P. KINGSTON, MATERNITY POLICIES AND WORKING WOMEN 49,
57, 141, 143 (1983); Frug, supra note 27, at 57-58.
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their work lives around family. How many women have been told, over
time, that they can only work if they can also keep up the household?
How many women would really choose to have two full-time jobs, one for
pay, and one without remuneration, appreciation, or assistance from their
partners, if social attitudes and expectations did not operate as
constraints?
Labor market structures often force the family commitment on women:
Because most women earn less than their partners, they are the ones most
able to give up full-time work with the least impact on the family income.
Conversely, the labor market also forces men to forego family involve-
ment, by denying men leave opportunities for childrearing and by penaliz-
ing the career advancement of any man who does try to disengage, even
temporarily, from the workplace in order to participate in home life. Yet
these workplace structures are not inevitable, as Kirp, Yudof, and Franks'
discussion of preference seems to assume. If the authors were really com-
mitted to the creation of more meaningful opportunities for men and
women to choose to break out of traditional patterns, the structure of the
labor market would be one of the first places to start a profound reexami-
nation. The existing male model of employment would have to be chal-
lenged, and choices available to women would have to be defined to in-
clude more than just the option of assimilating into the current male
defined workplace structures.
Kirp, Yudof, and Franks' discussion of women's job preferences re-
minds me of the opinion in EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,"' a recent
judicial decision whose acceptance of this sort of choice analysis has been
the subject of sharp scholarly debate among feminist historians.107 One of
the allegations of sex discrimination concerned the far lower numbers of
women than men occupying the higher paid commission sales positions
throughout Sears. The statement of qualifications for these positions reads
like a description of the stereotypical male: someone who is aggressive,
competitive, has lots of drive, physical vigor, and social dominance, some-
one with technical knowledge and fluency, someone who could frequently
work odd evening or weekend hours.1 08 People with prior experience sell-
ing technical product lines were preferred, and personnel interviewers
often evaluated candidates according to how closely they matched those
already doing the job,109 a comparison group that was almost totally male.
Perhaps recognizing how unlike their conceptions of themselves these very
106. 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D, Ill. 1986).
107. See Sears Bias-Case Ruling: No "Parade of Horribles," CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Mar.
12, 1986, at 44 (letter to editor from Rosalind Rosenberg); Two Scholars' Conflict in Sex Bias Case
Sets Off War in Women's History, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 5, 1986, at 1.
108. Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1290.
109. Id.
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male job descriptions were, most women who did apply to be sellers for
Sears stated a preference for selling noncommissioned and very female
products-jewelry, lingerie, cosmetics, and women's apparel."'
Sears defended the statistical disparity between men and women in the
commissioned jobs by arguing that it was due not to discrimination, but to
women's preferences and choices."" The court, relying on the views of
experts who spoke of the qualities of femininity, accepted the position that
any disparities were attributable to different interests and aspirations of
men and women regarding work.""' According to the expert testimony,
women's family obligations would make it either difficult or impossible
for them to meet the hour demands of the commission sales jobs, and
therefore women would shy away from those positions. Women, it was
claimed, are less assertive than men, and like work atmospheres that en-
tail cooperative, friendly relations with colleagues, rather than dog-eat-dog
competitiveness. 1
The court finds that women also do not like to accept financial risk as
much as men;' 14 this is perhaps because their economic dependence and
their principal responsibility for children can make monetary risk a sui-
cidal course. Women's education makes it less likely that they will have
the requisite technical background, comfort, or confidence in their ability
to master technical information. For all these reasons, it was not surpris-
ing that Sears encountered difficulties in attempting to convince women to
apply for positions selling machinery, home improvement devices, and au-
tomotive products.
Under the authors' choice analysis, the argument based on women's
nature ends the inquiry. Men and women simply are different, and that
means they have different interests. Government should do nothing to dis-
turb these natural preferences.1 1 5 But instead of satisfying these choice
110. Id. at 1306.
111. Id. at 1305.
112. Id. at 1315.
113. Id. at 1307.
114. Id.
115. Those who use observed differences between men and women to justify existing role dispari-
ties might try to exploit feminist analysis like that found in C. GILLIGAN, supra note 27, which
speaks of the different moral orientations of men and women. See, e.g., Barber, Beyond the Feminist
Mystique, NEw REPUBLIC, July 11, 1983, at 26 (using work of Gilligan to argue that inherent,
immutable sex differences may be undoing of traditional feminism's goal of equality between men and
women); Kerber, Greeno, Maccoby, Luria, Stack & Gilligan, in In a Different Voice: An Interdisci-
plinary Forum, 11 SIGNs 304, 304 (1986) (Kerber, criticizing Gilligan's analysis as tending to en-
trench ideas of differences and status quo). But this type of justification is a serious misuse of Gilli-
gan. Her work does not describe immutable differences between men and women; rather, it suggests
that existing ways of measuring human development may not be sufficiently reflective of the range of
orientations and perspectives of men and women. See id. at 524 (reply by Gilligan). Indeed, Gilligan's
message is compatible with what I call the radical perspective on choice. See infra text following note
117.
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advocates, these supposedly preference-based disparities between men and
women could lead to profoundly important inquiries about liberty. These
inquiries would suggest how men and women could be liberated from the
powerful constraints set by the social construction of gender roles. First,
rather than blaming women and their nature for their underrepresenta-
tion in the high paying jobs, why not reexamine the jobs and their values?
It may not be necessary for a salesperson to be an aggressive hustler will-
ing to pester the customer to sell the commissioned items successfully. It
may not be necessary to pit salespeople against each other; they could
cooperate as a team working for the good of the division rather than the
glory of any individual. There may be a way to accommodate the family
responsibilities of women with the need for a salesperson to be available
whenever a customer calls. Second, is the qualifications personality profile
really geared to the needs of the job, or does it merely describe those who
have been doing the job and the way they have been doing it? Just be-
cause a particular set of traits seems to produce sales, another approach is
not necessarily doomed to failure."" It may be useful to reexamine the
designation of some items as commission items and others, usually associ-
ated with women, as noncommission, and thus less "important" and re-
munerative to sell. The designations, which Sears might seek to attribute
to sales volume and profit margin,11  may be more directly linked to the
notion that some of the jobs will be done by men and some by women.
Finally, should it be of any concern to an equal liberty advocate that
when a woman sees the male bias in the job itself, she may sense that she
is not wanted or would suffer isolation and hazing on the job, and instead
may cope with the odds against her by convincing herself that she really
does not want what she probably would not get? A woman's "choice" to
accept a traditionally female sales position may not be such a free one,
after all.
The aim of these questions is not to suggest that preference analysis is
invalid, or that the choice principle is undesirable, but to raise again the
issue of the meaning of choice. These questions suggest that a liberty-
oriented approach could be reconceived as quite radical, if the goal is to
weaken the biases based on socially constructed notions of gender that
currently skew the choices of women and men, in order to liberate men
and women from the confines of existing expectations. The radical ap-
116. This discussion is not intended to imply that the government should force Sears to restruc-
ture its jobs for women, and thereby cause it to suffer at the hands of competitors who will now be
able to outhustle Sears. The point is that there is more than one way to sell something, and the hard
sell hustle may not turn out to to be the only or most successful way. Therefore, I am not proceeding
on the assumption that Sears would be playing sacrificial lamb if required to eliminate male bias in
its job conceptions.
117. See Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1289.
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proach would critique the value of such dichotomies as public and private,
aggressive and cooperative. It would examine the impact on women of the
male orientation of jobs and institutions, and women's perceptions of their
opportunities and "fit" with such jobs and institutions. It would seek to
open up institutions in both the public and private worlds to the perspec-
tives and experiences of both men and women, so that good interpersonal
skills, caring, cooperation, and flexibility to meet personal needs would be
valued in the business world, and respect for individuality would be val-
ued in the home world.
This conception is not, of course, what Kirp, Yudof, and Franks have
in mind when they write of enhancing choice, because it is not outcome
neutral. While this more radical conception does not presuppose some
ideal proportion of men and women in each position, including childrear-
ing, it does see the desired outcome as integrating the perspectives and
experiences of both genders in both the public and private worlds. Ulti-
mately the dichotomies between these worlds would be blurred, the con-
straints on self-determination imposed by social constructions would be
loosened, and the social constructions of gender roles would themselves
change.
This transformation would require far more interventionist policies
than those with which Kirp, Yudof, and Franks would be comfortable.
On the assumption that people exposed to new possibilities begin to
change their attitudes, government might require employers to grant
parenting leave and create incentives for men to take it. Employers might
need to restructure their advancement tracks, so that those of either sex
who assume parenting obligations need not sacrifice their careers. Em-
ployers might need to reevaluate the skills or traits currently considered
desirable for certain jobs. Government could provide incentives to try
things in new ways. It might even inaugurate affirmative action for men
in traditionally female jobs, as well as for women in traditionally male
jobs. Such significant departures from existing practices would be much
more likely to result in what Kirp, Yudof, and Franks profess to want: a
world in which men and women can exercise the full range of options
previously available primarily to the other sex, without risking undue eco-
nomic loss or social disapprobation for nontraditional choices, and a world
in which one's gender is not as determinative as it is now of what one can
do or wants to do.
III. FEMINIST METHODOLOGY AND THE CRITIQUE OF ABSTRACT
INDIVIDUALISM
The failure of Gender Justice to grapple with the meaning of "choice"
in a world of power disparities-one in which who we are, or can be, is
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greatly affected by gender roles and our interdependence with other
human beings-is attributable to an underlying analytic flaw in the book.
It is written in a distanced, coldly analytic tone. It is remarkably acontex-
tual and abstract, despite its frequent attention to specific policy issues.
The discussion proceeds with virtually no consideration of flesh and blood
people; there is almost no reflection on the real world impact of the poli-
cies at issue, particularly in the way these policies have shaped people's
lives and choices. There is little attention to history.
In all these failings, the book contains no hint of the influence of femi-
nist methodology. By this term I mean paying close attention to context,
such as the social construction of gender roles, and to the impact of prac-
tices on real lives, especially women's lives; challenging objectivity and the
possibility of writing without a predetermined perspective or set of desired
outcomes; rebelling against abstraction and professions of neutrality, be-
cause sensitivity to context and women's experience teaches that what is
claimed to be neutral is not.118
The feminist rebellion against abstractions and neutrality does not
mean theory must be abandoned. Rather, it means that theory must be
drawn from and inspired by concrete experience and human interaction.
Theory developed in this way can provide useful guidance for complex,
real issues,129 and is not abstract in the same way as theory derived from
overarching "neutral" principles, such as "equality" or "liberty." 20
Why is it important, or a fair criticism, that Gender Justice is not in-
fluenced by the insights of feminist methodology? The answer is emphati-
cally not that only those who consider themselves feminists should write
about women's issues. It is that the lens of abstraction is not the most
productive one for grappling, in a way that can actually affect people's
lives, with the problems of gender domination. The lens of feminist meth-
odology offers a more promising approach. The pursuit of gender justice
118. Women's experience and sensitivity to context challenges traditional methodologies. See
Vickers, Memoirs of an Ontological Exile: The Methodological Rebellions of Feminist Research, in
FEMINISM IN CANADA: FROM PRESSURE TO POLITICS 27 (G. Finn & A. Miles eds. 1982).
119. The work of Catharine MacKinnon is a powerful example of theory developed by feminist
methodology. MacKinnon, supra note 1; MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State:
Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983).
Her analysis of the way in which males have perpetuated their power and domination through the
definition and manipulation of female sexuality is not abstract in the conventional sense, because her
theory is grounded in the experience of women. It is inspired by a close observation of human interac-
tion and examination of feelings of anger, powerlessness, and invisibility. Reading MacKinnon pro-
vokes anger, flashes of recognition, identification with her subject, and enlightenment about actual
experiences in a way that reading Hegel, Rawls, or Nozick simply does not.
120. Cf. J. RAws, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971) (decisionmakers must place themselves
behind veil of ignorance of their own or anyone else's life situation to choose fair policies). Abstract
theories such as this look only occasionally to real problems of daily life to see if the theory can be
useful. When one considers a problem using a predetermined set of principles, one tends to see only
that to which the theory directs.
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must be about reclaiming and understanding women's experience, includ-
ing the ways in which the law has affected women and women have af-
fected the law. It must strive to relate theory to, and have theory informed
by, the reality of daily lives and experiences.
12 1
The questions that are asked within a feminist methodology may make
all of us leery of hidden biases, lurking beneath supposedly neutral, ab-
stract universals, such as process or liberty. We will understand that with-
out contextuality, abstractions are incomplete stories. When we analyze
"freedom of choice" in the context of gender roles and human intercon-
nectedness, we can understand that it is a complicated, multi-layered idea.
Attention to context does not mean simply telling stories about individu-
als, or performing a "microphenomenological" analysis that focuses pri-
marily on small, local events or interactions.122 Feminist methodology can
be quite global in the problems it tackles, such as the pervasiveness of
male domination and its sexual, political, and economic roots and implica-
tions. A contextual analysis starts not with abstract principles, but with a
sensitivity to the ways in which lives are constrained, shaped, or empow-
ered by practices, whether they are government policies or lack of policies,
or deeply held social ideologies and stereotypes. It is an analysis that seeks
to avoid generalizations based on the experiences or needs of one domi-
nant group, such as the white, employed middle-class, by remaining at-
tuned to class, race, and gender variances among social practices and their
effects. 2 ' But this leeriness of generalities and abstractions does not imply
perpetual relativism. Urging attention to the context and the complexity of
abstract ideas in practice is not to say there are no answers or concepts of
121. See, e.g., Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's
Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. (forthcoming 1986) (describing feminist litigators' reliance on women's
experience to formulate new legal claims regarding battering, reproductive freedom, and sexual
harassment).
122. Cf Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U.
PA. L. REv. 685 (1985) (developing "microphenomenological" approach).
123. While the authors do occasionally make statements that suggest sensitivity to the context of
race, class, poverty, and gender, their policy analysis belies any deep appreciation of the context to
which they allude. For example, in discussing child care, they state that "[flor poor parents, usually
mothers, the choice between finding a job and staying home is illusory." P. 192. The authors then
advocate a general family allowance, rather than expanded government child care programs, as the
most liberty enhancing solution because it will enable poor mothers either to purchase child care or to
mind their children at home. P. 194. But where is this welfare mother supposed to purchase child
care, if that is her preference? There are far fewer child care facilities than can meet current needs,
partly because such a female activity is generally devalued in "the market." Moreover, experience
indicates that the cost of private child care, h#hether in a center or by an individual worker, is still
likely to be far beyond the means of a poor woman, even with a government child care allowance.
While government operated child care centers may turn out to be inferior in staffing and resources to
some private centers and a poor woman may not have a real choice between government centers and
private arrangements, the actual availability of the public center resource to a poor woman may none-
theless make the "purchase child care and work" option a far more viable choice than would the
provision of a family allowance. The latter, when filtered through political reality, is not likely to
amount to much more than an inadequate supplement to meager AFDC allowances.
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right and wrong. It is instead to say that close attention to context and
experience is a more reliable guide than abstract theory to determine how
government policies will affect or have affected people. Appreciating the
varieties of perspectives, needs, options, and effects does not disable us
from arriving at conclusions or recommendations. It simply means that the
conclusions about what may be "choice-enhancing" are likely to be far
different from the conclusions derived from unexamined general
principles.
IV. CONCLUSION
Feminist methodology leads to the examination of the meaning of
"choice" in a gendered world. This examination of women's experience
and socialization as bearing on their choices and aspirations produces dif-
ferent questions than those usually asked by the traditional approach,
which seeks to fit the woman to the male job. This refined set of inquiries
ultimately leads one to question the dichotomies and the assumptions
around which Gender Justice is structured. Why should the autonomy of
a self unaffected by others be the goal of human life? Why not promote
altruism, responsibility, and interconnection as the primary aspirations?
These aspirations are not incompatible with freedom, unless freedom is
defined as complete disconnection from others. But how many people re-
ally want that kind of freedom? The freedom most of us want is the free-
dom to establish relationships with whomever we want, to base those rela-
tionships on mutual respect and care rather than domination and
dependency, and to live in a world where public institutions respect and
appreciate the obligations created by relationships. To reach that world it
will be necessary to do far more than refrain from interfering with ex-
isting "choices" that grow out of the currently prevailing power structure,
roles, and expectations of our society.

